Efficient decoy-states for the reference-frame-independent
  measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution by Lu, Feng-Yu et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
03
67
2v
3 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
26
 Fe
b 2
02
0
Efficient decoy-states for the reference-frame-independent
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution
Feng-Yu Lu,1, 2 Zhen-Qiang Yin,1, 2, ∗ Guan-Jie Fan-Yuan,1, 2 Rong Wang,1, 2 Hang Liu,1, 2 Shuang Wang,1, 2
Wei Chen,1, 2 De-Yong He,1, 2 Wei Huang,3 Bing-Jie Xu,3 Guang-Can Guo,1, 2 and Zheng-Fu Han1, 2
1Key Laboratory of Quantum Information, CAS Center For Excellence in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics,
University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China
2State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P. O. Box 5159, Beijing 100878, P. R. China
3Science and Technology on Communication Security Laboratory,
Institute of Southwestern Communication, Chengdu, Sichuan 610041, China
(Dated: February 27, 2020)
Reference-frame-independent measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (RFI-
MDI-QKD) is a novel protocol which eliminates all possible attacks on detector side and necessity
of reference-frame alignment in source sides. However, its performance may degrade notably due
to statistical fluctuations, since more parameters, e.g. yields and error rates for mismatched-basis
events, must be accumulated to monitor the security. In this work, we find that the original decoy-
states method estimates these yields over pessimistically since it ignores the potential relations
between different bases. Through processing parameters of different bases jointly, the performance
of RFI-MDI-QKD is greatly improved in terms of secret key rate and achievable distance when
statistical fluctuations are considered. Our results pave an avenue towards practical RFI-MDI-
QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution(QKD) [1], based on
information-theoretic security guaranteed by quantum
mechanics [2–5], allows two remote users, Alice and Bob,
to share secret keys. In recent decades, numerous efforts
have been made to improve the practical security and
applicability of QKD protocols and systems [6–19]. The
measurement-device-idependent quantum key distribu-
tion (MDI-QKD) [16] and reference-frame-independent
quantum key distribution (RFI-QKD) [19] are two of the
most successful efforts of them.
The MDI-QKD is proposed to eliminate all possible
detector side channel attacks. In this protocol, the most
fragile assumption [20–23] that the measurement unit is
ideal is removed. The protocol offers a great balance be-
tween practical security and usability. Up to now, several
MDI-QKD experiment has been presented [10, 24–27].
However, no matter which coding scheme, e.g. polariza-
tion coding or phase coding, was deployed, the coding
reference frame of Alice and Bob have to be rigorous
calibrated, which limits practical performance and may
bring side channels to QKD systems.
On the other hand, the RFI-QKD allows Alice and
Bob to share secret key bits without active alignment of
reference-frame. It was pointed out that the RFI-QKD is
particularly relevant for the earth to satellite QKD [28]
and time-bin encoded QKD [9]. However, the RFI-QKD
still suffers from the fatal detector side channel attacks
[20–23].
Fortunately, the combination of MDI-QKD and RFI-
QKD solved above problems. The RFI-MDI-QKD pro-
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tocol [29, 30] does not need active reference frame cali-
bration and immune to all detector side channel attacks.
The protocol simplifies the MDI-QKD, reduces the align-
ing expenses as well as security risk. Meanwhile, it closes
all detector side loopholes of RFI-QKD, which makes the
RFI-QKD more secure.
Nevertheless, there are still two gaps between practice
and theory. One of the gaps is the absence of ideal single-
photon source. The gap is solved by decoy-state method
[6–8, 31–35]. By randomly sending between so-called sig-
nal, decoy or vacuum states (weak coherent pulses with
different intensities), Alice and Bob can establish a secret
key strictly from information conveyed by single-photon
component in weak coherent state. Another gap is named
statistic fluctuation [32] which occurs when users only
have limited resources while the theory assumes unlim-
ited. The Refs. [32, 34, 35] have proposed countermea-
sure by analyzing statistical fluctuation. However, the
secret key rate of RFI-MDI-QKD are rather undesirable.
Compared with general MDI-QKD, the RFI version pre-
pares more bases and more states, which means it re-
quires more data to reduce the impact of the statistical
fluctuations. The Ref. [38] experimentally demonstrate
the RFI-MDI-QKD protocol to verified its feasibility and
The Ref. [39] further improves its the performance. How-
ever, to eliminate the impact of statistical fluctuations,
the Ref. [38] accumulates 3.5×1011 pulse pairs for about
100 hours and the Ref. [39] accumulates 3 × 1012 pulse
pairs for about 16 hours. Since the RFI protocol as-
sumes the misalignment of two unbiased bases are un-
known but fixed, which may be spoiled in such a long
system-running time and make the protocol not RFI any
more.
In this work, a new decoy-state method for RFI-MDI-
QKD is proposed. By considering the potentical relations
of different bases and applying the joint-study method
2[34] our new method reaches much higher secret key rate
and longer achievable distance in non-asymptotic scenar-
ios compared with existing theoretical and experimental
methods. Our new method can generate considerable key
rate given a smaller number of trials, which means less
time for data accumulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Sec. II A, we briefly introduce the RFI-MDI-QKD and
the previous decoy-state method [30, 38, 39]. Then in
Sec. II B, we present our improved protocol and intro-
duce our theorys and parameter estimation strategies for
improving the performance in non-asymptotic cases. In
Sec. III, the simulation results are showed to verify the
superiority of our new method. Finally, in Sec.IV, we
summarize our new method and introduce a more intu-
itive explanation of the improvement.
II. EFFICIENT DECOY-STATE RFI-MDI-QKD
A. original protocol
We use subscript A (B) to denote a variable or a pa-
rameter belongs to Alice (Bob). To simplicity, we will
omit the subscript A or B if not causing any ambiguity.
We define µ, ν, ω and o are intensities of weak coher-
ent pulse in decoy-state method, the µ > ν > ω > o
and o is the vacuum state. The probability of a weak
coherent pulse with intensity λ contains k photons is
λke−λ/k!, especially, we define pλk = (λA)
ke−λA/k! and
p′λk = (λB)
ke−λB/k! are photon number distribution
of Alice and Bob’s weak coherent pulse respectively.
The X , Y, Z are three coding bases. We define set
B = {XX ,XY ,YX ,YY ,ZZ}, the b ∈ B denotes the
coding basis selected by Alice and Bob, especialy, the
S = ZZ is defined as both of the users select Z basis
and D = {XX ,XY ,YX ,YY} is defined as a set which
both of the users select X or Y basis. In original MDI-
QKD, all bases should be carefully aligned, but in RFI-
MDI-QKD, the misalignment of X and Y bases can be
an unknown but fixed value, namely, the X and Y bases
of Alice (Bob) can be changed as:
XA(B) = X cosβA(B) + Y sinβA(B);
YA(B) = Y cosβA(B) −X sinβA(B),
(1)
where the β denotes the reference frame misalignment.
The original decoy-state RFI-MDI-QKD is described
as follows:
Step 1. Preparation: On each trial, Alice (Bob) ran-
domly codes her (his) phase randomized weak coherent
pulse on Z X or Y basis and randomly selects an in-
tensity l (r) from a pre-decided intensity set {µA, νA, o}
({µB, νB, o}) [30, 38–40]. After that, they send their
weak coherent pulse to the untrusted third party Char-
lie. When both of Alice and Bob select intensity µ and
Z basis, the pulse pair can be used to generate key bits.
Step 2. Measurement and announcement: When char-
lie receives a weak coherent pulse pair from Alice and
Bob, he does the Bell-state measurement and publicly
announces his measurement result.
Step 3. Post-processing: After the trial repeats Ntot-
times, There are N blr pulse pairs with intensity lr and
basis b in total. Alice and Bob can observe the overall
gain and the overall error yield of each kind of pulse pair.
We define Qblr and T
b
lr as the overall gain and the overall
error yield of the weak coherent pulse pairs with intensity
lr and basis b respectively. Then by applying the decoy-
state method [30, 33, 38–40], they can estimate yield and
quantum bit error rate of single-photon pulse pairs for
each basis. We define Y b11 and e
b
11 as, respectively, the
yield and qubit error rate of single-photon pulse pairs
with basis b, where b ∈ B. The information leakage is
described as:
IAE(C, e
S
11) = (1− e
S
11)H2[(1 + u)/2] + e
S
11H2[(1 + v)/2],
(2)
where
C =
∑
d∈D
(1− 2ed11)
2, (3)
and
u = min (
√
C/2/(1− eS11), 1),
v =
√
C/2− (1− eS11)
2u2/eS11.
(4)
The H2(p) = −p log2 p−(1−p)log2(1−p) is the Shannon
entropy[19, 29]. The secret key rate can be estimated by
the GLLP formula:
R ≥ pµ1p
′µ
1
{
Y S11
[
1−IAE(C, e
S
11)
]
−QSµµfeH2(
T Sµµ
QSµµ
)
}
, (5)
where the QSµµ and T
S
µµ are overall gain and overall er-
ror rate when Alice and Bob both select intensity µ and
Zbasis; the fe denotes the reconciliation efficiency in key
reconciliation phase.
In the non-asymptotic scenario, the data size is finite,
thus the statistical fluctuation of observed overall gains
and overall error rates must be considered. The statis-
tical fluctuation seriously harms the secret key rate and
achievable distance of QKD systems. Especially, com-
pared with other types of QKD protocol, the statisti-
cal fluctuation harms the RFI-MDI-QKD system partic-
ularly serious since the RFI-MDI-QKD has more kinds
of pulse pair which scatters the accumulated data and
makes the fluctuation more obvious. Meanwhile, the β
may drift while accumulating data, which may invalidate
the RFI protocol.
In this work, we find that the previous works [30, 38–
40] estimate the yield and quantum bit error rate of each
basis individually and ignore the potential relations of
different basis. By analyzing these relations, we propose
an improved decoy method for RFI-MDI-QKD which
performs much better in non-asymptotic scenario.
3B. improved protocol
In our new decoy-state method, the step 1 is modified
as follows:
New step 1 : Alice (Bob) randomly selects X , Y, Z
basis or selects vacuum state o with no basis. If Z basis
is selected, Alice (Bob) only select intensity µA (µB); if
X or Y basis is selected, Alice (Bob) randomly selects in-
tensity νA or ωA (νB or ωB). In the improved protocol,
the weak coherent pulses in Z basis are only employed
to generate key bits, we define the Z basis as the sig-
nal basis ; the X and Y bases are employed to estimated
parameters, we define them as decoy basis.
In non-asyptotic scenarios, the differences of observed
values and expected values must be taken into consider.
Simular to previous works, we estimate the upper and
lower bound of Q and T by Chernoff bound [38, 39, 41]:
N blr〈M
b
lr〉 ≤ F
+(N blrM
b
lr) = N
b
lrM
b
lr + f(
( ǫ2 )
4
16
)
√
N blrM
b
lr,
N blr〈M
b
lr〉 ≥ F
−(N blrM
b
lr) = N
b
lrM
b
lr − f((
ǫ
2
)
3
2 )
√
N blrM
b
lr,
(6)
where M blr denotes Q
b
lr or T
b
lr, the 〈M
b
lr〉 donotes the ex-
pected value of M blr, the ǫ is the failure probability and
f(x) =
√
2 ln(x−1).
To simplification, we define:
ak = p
µ
k , a
′
k = p
′µ
k ,
bk = p
ν
k , b
′
k = p
′ν
k,
ck = p
ω
k , c
′
k = p
′ω
k .
(7)
In the original decoy-state method, the yield and quan-
tum bit error rate of single-photon pulse pairs for each
basis are estimated individually:
Y d11 ≥ Y
d
11 =
{
[b1b
′
2Q
b
ωω
+ c1c
′
2b0Q
d
oν
+ c1c
′
2b
′
0Q
d
νo
+ b1b
′
2c0c
′
0Q
d
oo
]
− [c1c
′
2Q
d
νν + b1b
′
2c0Q
d
oω + b1b
′
2c
′
0Q
d
ωo + b0b
′
0c1c
′
2Q
d
oo]
}/
[b1b2(c
′
1b
′
2 − b
′
1c
′
2)], for d ∈ B,
(8)
ed11 ≤ e
d
11 =
[T
d
µµ + a0a
′
0T oo]− [a0T
d
oµ + a
′
0T
d
µo]
a1a′1Y
d
11
, for d ∈ B, where (9)
Q
b
lr = F
+(N blrQ
b
lr)/N
b
lr, Q
b
lr
= F−(N blrQ
b
lr)/N
b
lr,
T
b
lr = F
+(N blrT
b
lr)/N
b
lr, T
b
lr = F
−(N blrT
b
lr)/N
b
lr.
(10)
Here we introduce our improved decoy-state method based on potiential relations of different basis for estimating
secret key rate in non-asymptotic case.
Relation 1: Since the desity matrices of single-photon pulse pair in XX , XY, YX , YY and ZZ bases are quite the
same, the yield Y XX11 = Y
XY
11 = Y
YX
11 = Y
YY
11 = Y
S
11 [35].
Based on the Relation 1, we can estimate the Y S11 by X or Y basis, namely, the decoy basis. In signal basis Z, we
only modulate intensity µ to generate key bits.
Relation 2: When estimating Y S11, all pulse pairs in decoy basis can be regarded as an entirety. The set D include
all decoy basis, define Y D11 as the average yield of single-photon pulse pairs in the joint decoy basis. It is obvious that,
the Y S11 = Y
D
11 .
We define QDlr =
∑
D
ND
lr
QD
lr
ND
lr
and TDlr =
∑
D
ND
lr
TD
lr
ND
lr
as the gain and error yield of the weak coherent pulse pair in the
joint decoy basis respectively, where the NDlr = N
XX
lr +N
XY
lr +N
YX
lr +N
YY
lr .
By applying the relation 1, relation 2 and the joint-study method proposed in Ref. [34], we can estimate a tight
common lower bound of Y11 for any of the basis by solving the linear programming
4min : Y 11 = Y
D
11 =
{
[c1c
′
2〈Q
D
νν〉+ b1b
′
2c0〈Q
D
oω〉+ b1b
′
2c
′
0〈Q
D
ωo〉+ b0b
′
0c1c
′
2〈Q
D
oo〉]
−[b1b
′
2〈Q
D
ωω〉+ c1c
′
2b0〈Q
D
oν〉+ c1c
′
2b
′
0〈Q
D
νo〉+ b1b
′
2c0c
′
0〈Q
D
oo〉]
}/
[b1b
′
2(b
′
1c
′
2 − c
′
1b
′
2)];
s.t. :
F+(NDlrQ
D
lr) ≥ N
D
lr 〈Q
D
lr〉 ≥ F
−(NDlrQ
D
lr); for any l, r ∈ {ν, ω, o},
F+(NDνoQ
D
νo +N
D
νoQ
D
νo) ≥ N
D
νo〈Q
D
νo〉+N
D
νo〈Q
D
νo〉 ≥ F
−(NDνoQ
D
νo +N
D
νoQ
D
νo),
F+(NDωoQ
D
ωo +N
D
ωoQ
D
ωo) ≥ N
D
ωo〈Q
D
ωo〉+N
D
ωo〈Q
D
ωo〉 ≥ F
−(NDωoQ
D
ωo +N
D
ωoQ
D
ωo),
NDνν〈Q
D
νν〉+N
D
νo〈Q
D
νo〉+N
D
oν〈Q
D
oν〉+N
D
ooQ
D
oo〉 ≤ F
+(NDννQ
D
νν +N
D
νoQ
D
νo +N
D
oνQ
D
oν +N
D
ooQ
D
oo)
NDνν〈Q
D
νν〉+N
D
νo〈Q
D
νo〉+N
D
oν〈Q
D
oν〉+N
D
oo〈Q
D
oo〉 ≥ F
−(NDννQ
D
νν +N
D
νoQ
D
νo +N
D
oνQ
D
oν +N
D
ooQ
D
oo),
NDωω〈Q
D
ωω〉+N
D
ωo〈Q
D
ωo〉+N
D
oω〈Q
D
oω〉+N
D
oo〈Q
D
oo〉 ≤ F
+(NDωωQ
D
ωω +N
D
ωoQ
D
ωo +N
D
oωQ
D
oω +N
D
ooQ
D
oo),
NDωω〈Q
D
ωω〉+N
D
ωo〈Q
D
ωo〉+N
D
oω〈Q
D
oω〉+N
D
oo〈Q
D
oo〉 ≥ F
−(NDωωQ
D
ωω +N
D
ωoQ
D
ωo +N
D
oωQ
D
oω +N
D
ooQ
D
oo).
(11)
Relation 3: Any combinations of XX , XY, YX and YY basis can be regarded as an entirety. Define ed1d211 is the
quantun bit error rate of the single-photon pulse pairs in the joint basis of d1 and d2, where d1, d2 ∈ D and d1 6= d2.
Define eD11 is the quantun bit error rate of the single-photon pulse pairs the joint basis D. When Alice and Bob select
X and Y basis with equal probability, the ed1d211 = (e
d1
11 + e
d2
11)/2, the e
D
11 = (
∑
d∈D e
d
11)/4
By applying Relation 3, we can introduce more constraints for estimating a tighter lower bound of information
leakage. We define:
E
d
λ,11 =
[T
d
λ + p
λ
0p
′λ
0T oo]− [p
λ
0T
d
oλ + p
′λ
0T
d
λo]
pλ1p
′λ
1
. (12)
The ed11 ≤ E
d
λ,11/Y 11. Similarly, we define E
d1d2
λ,11 and E
D
λ,11. It is obvious that e
d1d2
11 ≤ E
d1d2
λ,11 /Y 11 and e
D
11 ≤ E
D
λ,11/Y 11.
The E
d
λ,11, E
d1d2
λ,11 and E
D
λ,11 can be estimated by the joint study method [34] as follows:
max : E
d
λ,11 =
[〈T dλλ〉+ p
λ
0p
′λ
0 〈T
d
oo〉]− [p
λ
0 〈T
d
oλ〉+ p
′λ
0 〈T
d
λo〉]
pλ1p
′λ
1
; for λ ∈ {ν, ω}, d ∈ B ,
s.t. :
F+(NdlrT
d
lr) ≥ N
d
lr〈T
d
lr〉 ≥ F
−(NdlrT
d
lr),
F+(NdλoT
d
λo +N
d
oλT
d
oλ) ≥ N
d
λo〈T
d
λo〉+N
d
oλ〈T
d
oλ〉 ≥ F
−(NdλoT
d
λo +N
d
oλT
d
oλ) ,
F+(NdλλT
d
λλ +N
d
ooT
d
oo) ≥ N
d
λλ〈T
d
λλ〉+N
d
oo〈T
d
oo〉 ≥ F
−(NdλλT
d
λλ +N
d
ooT
d
oo) .
(13)
max : E
d1d2
λ,11 =
[〈T d1d2λλ 〉+ p
λ
0p
′λ
0 〈T
d1d2
oo 〉]− [p
λ
0 〈T
d1d2
oλ 〉+ p
′λ
0 〈T
d1d2
λo 〉]
pλ1p
′λ
1
; for λ ∈ {ν, ω}, d1, d2 ∈ D and d1 6= d2,
s.t. :
F+(Nd1d2lr T
d1d2
lr ) ≥ N
d1d2
lr 〈T
d1d2
lr 〉 ≥ F
−(Nd1d2lr T
d1d2
lr ),
F+(NdλoT
d1d2
λo +N
d1d2
oλ T
d1d2
oλ ) ≥ N
d1d2
λo 〈T
d1d2
λo 〉+N
d1d2
oλ 〈T
d1d2
oλ 〉 ≥ F
−(Nd1d2λo T
d1d2
λo +N
d1d2
oλ T
d1d2
oλ ) ,
F+(Nd1d2λλ T
d1d2
λλ +N
d1d2
oo T
d1d2
oo ) ≥ N
D
λλ〈T
d1d2
λλ 〉+N
d1d2
oo 〈T
d1d2
oo 〉 ≥ F
−(Nd1d2λλ T
d1d2
λλ +N
d1d2
oo T
d1d2
oo ) .
(14)
max : E
D
λ,11 =
[〈TDλλ〉+ p
λ
0p
′λ
0 〈T
D
oo〉]− [p
λ
0 〈T
D
oλ〉+ p
′λ
0 〈T
D
λo〉]
pλ1p
′λ
1
; for λ ∈ {ν, ω},
s.t. :
F+(NDlrT
D
lr ) ≥ N
D
lr 〈T
D
lr 〉 ≥ F
−(NDlr T
D
lr ),
F+(NDλoT
D
λo +N
D
oλT
D
oλ) ≥ N
D
λo〈T
D
λo〉+N
D
oλ〈T
D
oλ〉 ≥ F
−(NDλoT
D
λo +N
D
oλT
D
oλ) ,
F+(NDλλT
D
λλ +N
D
ooT
D
oo) ≥ N
D
λλ〈T
D
λλ〉+N
D
oo〈T
D
oo〉 ≥ F
−(NDλλT
D
λλ +N
D
ooT
D
oo) .
(15)
5By applying the relation 3, a tighter lower bound for the intermediate variable C can be estimated by optimization
algorithms:
min : C =
∑
d∈D
(1− 2ed11)
2,
s.t. :
ed11 ≥ 0,
ed11 ≤ min(E
d
ν,11, E
d
ω,11)/Y 11,
ed111 + e
d2
11 ≤ 2min(E
d1d2
ν,11 , E
d1d2
ω,11)/Y 11,∑
d∈D
ed11 ≤ 4min(E
D
ν,11, E
D
ω,11)/Y 11.
(16)
Finally, a tighter secret key rate in non-asymptotic scenario can be estimated as follows:
R ≥ PrSAPr
S
Ba1a
′
1
{
Y 11
[
1− IAE(C, e
S
11)
]
−QSµµfH2(
T Sµµ
QSµµ
)
}
, (17)
where PrSA (Pr
S
B) denotes the probability that Alice (Bob) sends code mode, the e
S
11 = E
S
µ,11/Y 11 and the intermediate
values are:
v =
√
C/2− (1 − eS11)
2u2/eS11,
u = min (
√
C/2/(1− eS11), 1),
IAE(C, e
S
11) = (1− e
S
11)H2[(1 + u)/2] + e
S
11H2[(1 + v)/2].
(18)
III. SIMULATION
In this section, we simulate our new decoy-state
method for RFI-MDI-QKD and compare the results with
the best known prior article results (Refs.[39, 40]) with
device parameters which listed in Tab.I.
Firstly, we illustrate the improvement of estimating
the Y 11 and C in Fig. 1. By employing our relation 2
and relation 3, the Y 11 and C are significantly estimated
tighter, especially when Ntot is less than 10
11.
Then we simulate the optimized secret key rate as a
function of transmission distance. We focus on the sym-
metric case where the distance from Alice to Charlie and
from Bob to Charlie are equal, due to the symmetric
case, we treat the parameters of Alice Bob equivalently
for simplicity. We define µ = µA = µB, ν = νA = νB,
TABLE I. The table lists the device parameters of our sim-
ulation. The ηd denotes the detection efficiency; the pd de-
notes the dark count rate; the ed denotes the misalignment
error rate; the fe denotes the reconciliation efficiency in key
reconciliation phase; the ǫ denotes the failure probability of
parameter estimation; the α denotes the fiber loss per km.
ηd pd ed fe ǫ α
25% 10−6 0.5% 1.16 10−7 0.02 dB/km
ω = ωA = ωB and define Pr
S
µ , Pr
D
ν , Pr
D
ω as the prob-
ability of Alice (Bob) selects intensity µ ν ω respec-
tively. The probability of selecting vacuum state o is
1 − PrSµ − Pr
D
ν − Pr
D
ω . Alice (Bob) selects X or Y ba-
sis with equal probability. By optimizing µ, ν, ω, PrSµ ,
PrDν , Pr
D
ω with particle swarm optimization algorithm
(PSO) [42], we investigate our new decoy method at dif-
ferent data size Ntot and compare our result with previ-
ous works [39, 40].
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the comparison results at different
reference frame misalignment are illustrated. The simu-
lation results indicate that our new method and the pre-
vious method have the same performance in the asymp-
totic case, but when data size is finite, our method per-
forms much better. Our method can generate consider-
able key rate with about only 1010 data size, which is
significantly less than previous works. When 50 MHz
system [39] is employed, only several minutes are needed
to accumulate enough data. Especially, if the GHz high-
speed system [11, 14, 43] system is employed, only several
seconds are needed, which can make the protocol practi-
cally reference frame independent.
The Fig. 4 illustrate the secret key rate as a function
of data size Ntot. The simulation results indicate that
our improved method can generate considerable key rate
when Ntot = 10
10 while the original method need more
than 1011 or 1012. When the GHz system is employed,
61010 1011 1012
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0.018
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0.024
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C
FIG. 1. The estimated Y
11
and C as a function of data size.
The blue and red line denote the estimated value of Y
11
and
C respectively; the solid line denotes our improved method
and the dash line denotes the original method; the dash-dot
line denotes the asymptotic cases. The ν and ω are fixed to
0.2 and 0.05 respectively, the probability of selecting µ, ν, ω
and o are equal; the device parameters are listed in Tab. I
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FIG. 2. The secret key rate as function of communication
distance. In this figure, the reference frame of Alice and Bob is
well aligned. The black dash-dot line denotes the asymptotic
case. The solid line and dash line denote, respectively, our
improved decoy method and original method; the blue, red
and yellow denote, respectively, Ntot is 10
12, 1011 and 1010.
the Ntot = 10
10 is an accepted data size to ensure the
system practical RFI. In the scenario of Ntot = 10
10,
β = 0 and L = 10-km, the secure key rate of our method
is 130 times of previous method; when L = 20 km, our
method is 3000 times of previous.
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FIG. 3. The secret key rate as function of communication
distance. In this figure, the reference frame misalignment
of Alice and Bob is fixed to 25◦. The black dash-dot line
denotes the asymptotic case. The solid line and dash line
denote, respectively, our improved decoy method and original
method; the blue, red and yellow denote, respectively, Ntot is
1012, 1011 and 1010.
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FIG. 4. The secure key rate versus different data size. The
reference-frame misalignment β is fixed to 0 here. The blue
and red line denote, respectively, tranmission distance is 20
and 40 km. The soild line denotes our new method, the dash
line denotes the previous method and the dash-dot lines are
the asymptotic cases.
IV. DISCUSSION
In the practical RFI-MDI-QKD systems, the statistical
fluctuation must be taken into consideration. The previ-
ous works [38–40] ignore the potential relations of each
modes and each basis and only use the worst-case calcu-
lation for estimating Y 11 and C. To alleviate the impact
of statistical fluctuation, a new decoy-state method for
RFI-MDI-QKD is proposed. By employing three rela-
7tions introduced in Sec. II B and the joint-study method
proposed in Ref. [34], Our method only modulates inten-
sity µ in Z basis and estimates the yield by the combina-
tion of decoy basis. We also introduce more constraints
for intermediate variable C, which makes the information
leakage estimated much tighter. The simulation results
indicate that our method can generate a considerable se-
cret key rate with only 1010 data size, which is signifi-
cantly less than the previous method. Our method sig-
nificantly reduces the time for accumulating data, which
mitigates the drift of the reference frame during accumu-
lating data and makes the protocol practically reference
frame independent.
Here, we introduce a more intuitive explanation for our
improvement. Firstly, in previous works, the intensity µ
is used to generate key rates and parameter estimation.
However, in non-asymptotic cases, the optimized inten-
sity for generating key rates is usually not equal to it
for parameter estimation. In our new method, we in-
troduce the fourth intensity ω for parameter estimation
and the µ is not used to estimate Y11 anymore, which
leads to a higher secret key rate when all parameters
are optimized. Secondly, the new method only modu-
lates µ on Z basis, which means less observed values are
needed. Finally, by considering the potential relations of
different bases and different modes, more constraints can
be introduced when estimating Y 11 and C, which makes
them estimated much tighter. By applying our improved
decoy-stated method, the performance of RFI-MDI-QKD
can be greatly improved and the time for data accumu-
lation can be significantly reduced. Our results pave an
avenue towards practical RFI-MDI-QKD.
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